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Abstract 
Using a sample of syndicated loans to private equity (PE)-backed IPO companies, we examine 
how a third-party bank relationship influences the syndicate structure of a loan. We find that a 
stronger relationship between the lead bank and the borrower’s PE firm enables the lead bank to 
retain a smaller share of the loan and form a larger and less concentrated syndicate, especially 
when the borrower is less transparent. A stronger PE-bank relationship also attracts greater foreign 
bank participation. Our findings suggest that the lead bank’s relationship with a large equity holder 
of the borrower facilitates information production in lending.   
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1. Introduction 
We examine how the relationship between a bank and a borrower’s equity blockholder, 
which we call a third-party bank relationship, affects information production in lending. Using a 
sample of syndicated loans made to U.S. initial public offering (IPO) companies backed by private 
equity (PE) firms, we study the effect of the relationship between a bank and a PE firm on 
information production in the syndicated loans market. 1  For loans made to PE-backed IPO 
companies, we find that a stronger PE-bank relationship is associated with a lower lead bank share, 
a larger and less concentrated syndicate, and a higher probability of foreign bank participation, 
suggesting that PE-bank relationships facilitate information production in lending. These results 
also suggest that PE-bank relationships allow a PE-backed borrower to have better access to capital 
and make it possible for the lead bank to free up its capital and lend more to other borrowers.  
Theories predict that PE-bank relationships can influence the informational environment 
of a PE-backed IPO company in taking a loan. When the PE firm possesses private information 
about the IPO company, a stronger relationship between the PE firm and the bank could catalyze 
a more efficient acquisition and sharing of information about the borrower, thereby reducing the 
lead bank’s costs of due diligence and monitoring. However, the lead bank’s relationship with the 
PE firm could augment the bank’s informational advantage over other potential lenders, imposing 
undesired costs on the borrower if it sidelines the other lenders and leads to adverse selection/hold-
up problems (Rajan, 1992). Even if PE-bank relationships lower the lead bank’s due diligence and 
monitoring costs, the bank could have an informational monopoly that prevents it from sharing the 
                                                          
1 PE firms are active players in the syndicated loans market and build   relationships with banks (Ivashina and Kovner, 
2011). PE firms often retain influential equity stakes and/or serve on the boards of their portfolio companies in the 
first several years after the companies go public (Cao and Lerner, 2009; Huang, Ritter, and Zhang, 2016). PE-
sponsored IPOs include both reversed leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) and IPOs of private companies that were bought 
by PE firms and did not go through a public-to-private transition. The PE sponsor of an IPO is not necessarily the 
sponsor of a post-IPO loan. Unless the context suggests otherwise, a PE sponsor in this paper refers to the fact that the 
PE firm is the sponsor of the borrower’s recent IPO, not the loan. 
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benefits with the borrower. It is also possible that PE-bank relationships no longer matter once the 
borrower becomes public. Therefore, it is an empirical question as of which effect, if any, of the 
PE-bank relationship on post-IPO lending dominates.    
We study the effect of PE-bank relationship on loan syndicate structure, an important 
aspect of lending. The literature suggests that information asymmetries between a borrower and 
its lender(s) and within a lending syndicate are a critical determinant of the syndicate structure 
(e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009; Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli, 
2011; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2012). The lead bank of a syndicated loan package conducts 
due diligence on the borrower and markets the loan package to a group of potential participant 
lenders. The lead bank is also responsible for ex post monitoring of the borrower during the life of 
the loan. Because the lead bank owns only a fraction of the loan but bears virtually all of the due 
diligence and monitoring costs, it has an incentive to shirk due diligence/monitoring 
responsibilities when its efforts are imperfectly observable to the participant lenders. Furthermore, 
the lead bank has an incentive to allocate a larger share of a lower quality loan to the participant 
banks (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995). The participant banks are more concerned about these moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems when information asymmetries among the borrower, the 
lead bank, and the participant banks are greater. In equilibrium, the lead bank holds a larger 
fraction of the loan to mitigate the participant banks’ concerns when there is greater asymmetric 
information.  
We test two competing hypotheses. The efficient information production hypothesis posits 
that a stronger relationship between the PE firm and the lead bank reduces the costs for the lead 
bank to investigate and monitor the underlying borrower, and thus alleviate potential participant 
banks’ concerns about the lead bank’s incentive to shirk due diligence/monitoring responsibilities. 
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This hypothesis predicts a negative association between the lead bank’s share of the loan and the 
PE-lead bank relationship. The exclusive informational advantage hypothesis, on the contrary, 
suggests that a stronger relationship between the PE firm and the lead bank elevates the lead bank’s 
informational advantage over the participant lenders, which become more concerned about getting 
more of a lower quality loan. This hypothesis predicts a positive association between the lead 
bank’s share of the loan and the PE-lead bank relationship. 
We analyze syndicate structures for a sample of 291 syndicated loans to PE-backed IPO 
companies between 1995 and 2011. Our primary measure of a PE-bank relationship is the ratio of 
the total dollar amount of loans from this particular bank and sponsored by this particular PE firm 
over the total dollar amount of all loans sponsored by the PE firm during the past five years. Our 
findings strongly support the efficient information production hypothesis. Lead banks retain 
significantly smaller factions of loans made to PE-backed IPO companies when these banks have 
stronger prior lending relationships with the PE firms. A stronger PE-bank relationship also relates 
to a less concentrated syndicate (measured by the Herfindahl index of loan shares of all lenders in 
the syndicate). Economically, one of our regressions shows that a one-standard-deviation increase 
in the PE-bank relationship allows the lead bank to hold 6.44% less of a loan. For our sample of 
loans to PE-backed IPO companies, the average loan amount is $216 million with the average lead 
bank share of 51%. If we assume that the lead bank can only provide $110 million for a loan due 
to regulatory capital constraints, a 6.44% decrease from 51% to 44.56% in the lead bank share 
would imply an increase of $31 million in the loan amount to $247 million. Such an increase in 
credit supply can be important for many IPO companies. 
Our results also suggest that PE-bank relationships and their effects on syndicate structure 
are beneficial to a lead bank. If the lead bank of a loan can hold 6.44% or $14 million less of the 
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loan when the PE-bank relationship increases by one standard deviation, the bank could hold $96 
million instead of $110 million. If the bank has $1.1 billion to lend, it can hold a portfolio of 11.5 
loans instead of 10 loans. Practitioners emphasize that a loan’s yield on a stand-alone basis is often 
not attractive to a bank in terms of its risk-return tradeoff. The bank often evaluates a loan as a 
component of a portfolio of all businesses with the borrower (S&P, 2016). Lending to more 
companies can be very beneficial to a bank as it can develop relationships with more borrowers 
and gain opportunities of cross-selling other banking products. 
The negative effect of PE-bank relationship on lead bank share and syndicate concentration 
is robust when we control for loan characteristics, the lead bank and PE firm reputations, the 
borrower-lead bank relationship, the lead bank’s underwriting relationships with the borrower, and 
the borrower-participant banks relationship. These results are also robust with controlling for the 
lead bank and PE firm fixed effects. 
The effect of PE-bank relationship on lead bank share could reflect a selection bias. A PE 
firm could select a bank with which it has a stronger relationship as the lead bank for a loan to a 
better portfolio company. To alleviate this concern, we use the strongest bank relationship of the 
PE firm measured prior to the current loan as the instrumental variable (IV). This IV correlates 
with the PE firm’s relationship with the lead bank of the current loan, but it does not correlate with 
the borrower’s quality because it is measured prior to the selection of the lead bank. The effect of 
PE-bank relationships on the lead bank’s loan share in our two-stage least square (2SLS) 
regressions is qualitatively similar to that in the OLS regressions, suggesting that our results are 
not driven by the selection of a stronger relationship bank for a higher quality borrower.  
Consistent with its role in reducing the lead bank share, a strong PE-bank relationship also 
attracts more lenders to the syndicate, increases the probability of having a non-U.S. participant 
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lender, and associates with a shorter syndication process. In the cross-section, the effect of PE-
bank relationships is more pronounced for more informationally opaque borrowers. These findings 
provide further support for the efficient information production hypothesis rather than the exclusive 
informational advantage hypothesis.2     
Taken together, our results shed new light on the scope of information production by 
financial intermediaries. The literature on relationship banking focuses on how the bilateral 
relationship between the borrower and its bank incentivizes information production (e.g., Sharpe, 
1990; Rajan, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Boot, 2000; Ongena and 
Smith, 2000; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2011). We show that the relationship 
between a borrower’s shareholder and bank also facilitates information production. This is a new 
layer of bank relationship that has not been closely examined in the literature.  
Our paper also sheds light on the benefits of relationship lending for banks. Ivashina and 
Kovner (2011) shows that the yield spread on a leveraged buyout (LBO) loan is negatively related 
to the PE sponsor’s previous relationships with the lead lender. A lower loan spread benefits the 
borrower. We focus on lead bank share, a non-pecuniary measure. A negative association between 
PE-bank relationship and lead bank share can benefit both the borrower and the lead bank. The 
borrower can gain greater credit supply as the participant banks contribute more of the loan. The 
lead bank can free up its capital to lend more to other borrowers (Chu, Zhang, and Zhao, 2017), 
which can provide significant benefits to the bank in developing broader relationship lending.  
Finally, our focus on post-IPO financing broadens our understanding of the long-term 
                                                          
2 We also show that differences in syndicate structure is unlikely to be reflected or compensated for in loan pricing. 
In unreported results, we regress lead bank share on loan spread along with other control variables and find no 
significant association between lead bank share and loan spread. That is, lead banks retain a lower share but not at the 
cost of a higher spread for the borrower.  
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influence of PE firms as a special (and sometimes controversial) group of investors.3 PE firms 
have significant equity stakes in an increasing number of U.S. companies. The fraction of U.S. 
IPOs backed by PE firms has increased substantially from the 1990s to the 2000s (Huang, Ritter, 
and Zhang, 2016). PE-backed IPOs tend to have better stock and operating performance than other 
IPOs (e.g., Cao and Lerner, 2009; Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song, 2011). Although they face less 
information asymmetry than private companies, new public companies are still prone to 
information asymmetry problems and often have great needs for external financing (Helwege and 
Liang, 1996; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009; Bouwman and Lowry, 2012; Hertzel, Huson, and 
Parrino, 2012). It is important if a PE sponsor can help an IPO company gain access to extra credit 
by alleviating informational problems faced by the company. Our results provide an explanation 
for the superior performance of PE-backed IPO companies.  
2. Hypothesis development  
In a syndicated loan, a group of lenders lend to a borrower and the lead bank originates the 
loan and performs due diligence and monitoring (Esty, 2001; Ivashina and Sun, 2011). Information 
asymmetries affect the syndication outcome (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). On one level, agency 
problems exist due to information asymmetries between the borrower and its lender(s). Costly due 
diligence and monitoring by the lender(s) is necessary to mitigate such problems (e.g., Harris and 
Raviv, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979; Smith and Warner, 1979). There are also incentive problems for 
the lead bank due to information asymmetry within the syndicate. Because the lead bank passes 
along a portion of the loan to the participant lenders, there is an adverse selection concern among 
the participant lenders that they receive more  low quality loans. Because the lead bank is also the 
                                                          
3 PE sponsors can bring in more effective monitoring to their portfolio companies and provide management with a 
stronger incentive to improve efficiency (Jensen, 1986; Kaplan, 1989). Alternatively, PE sponsors could gain via 
transferring wealth from other stakeholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Warga and Welch, 1993). 
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“delegated monitor” of the syndicate, it has an incentive to shirk monitoring when its monitoring 
effort cannot be observed and thus fairly compensated by the participant banks (Diamond, 1984). 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) suggest that in equilibrium the lead bank has to hold a certain portion 
of a loan that it syndicates so  the other lenders can be assured that the borrower is of acceptable 
quality and will be monitored properly. The lead bank has to take a larger fraction of a loan if the 
borrower requires more intense due diligence and greater monitoring effort. Consequently, if there 
exists a PE-bank relationship that can reduce due diligence and monitoring costs, more lenders 
will participate in the syndicate and provide more funding for the loan. 
A prior relationship with a PE firm, who is often an informed equity blockholder, can help 
the bank to acquire valuable borrower-specific information. A PE firm is likely to possess some 
proprietary information, including “soft” information, on the IPO company that used to be part of 
its portfolio. PE firms engage in financial, governance, and operational engineering to enhance the 
valuations of their portfolio companies (Kaplan, Sensoy, and Strömberg, 2009; Gompers, Kaplan, 
and Mukharlyamov, 2015; Malenko and Malenko, 2015). Such efforts are likely to have a long-
term effect on the companies (Cao and Lerner, 2009). Due to their considerable involvement in 
these companies before the IPO, PE firms could have a vision for the companies’ investment plans, 
cash flow projections, etc. Such information can help a bank determine the borrower’s future 
prospect. The PE firm could also hold private information about the characteristics of the 
borrower’s management teams. Such knowledge can help a bank better assess the borrower’s 
management competence.4  
                                                          
4 A good example for a PE firm’s “soft” information and influence is Blackstone’s Hilton LBO. This is one of the 
most lucrative private equity deals in history: Blackstone made $9 billion profit at Hilton’s IPO on December 13, 2013 
on a $5.6 billion investment in the LBO deal. Blackstone bought Hilton in the fall of 2007, at the peak of the real 
estate boom. The deal’s success is not due to its timing. Instead, the choice of Christopher Nassetta as CEO, Hilton’s 
reconstructing for focusing on overseas markets and luxury brands, and Hilton’s voluntary restructuring of its debt 
with its 26 creditors during the financial crisis are probably among the important reasons. Blackstone’s expertise and 
bank relationships likely contributed to the success of the debt restructuring. See Willian D. Cohan’s story on the 
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PE firms have the incentive to reveal information on borrowers to their relationship banks. 
PE firms generally still have large equity ownership in PE-backed IPO companies in the first few 
years after the IPO.5 If reduced asymmetric information lowers financing costs of an IPO company, 
the PE firm would also benefit as a significant stakeholder. Even when the PE firm no longer has 
large ownership in a PE-backed IPO company at the time of the loan, its general partner(s) could 
still serve as a board member of the borrower. A PE firm’s reputational concerns and ongoing 
interactions with its relationship lenders could also induce truthful revelation of borrower 
information (Huang, Ritter, and Zhang, 2016). 
Taken together, the above arguments lead to our first hypothesis, which we call the efficient 
information production hypothesis: 
H1: Efficient Information Production Hypothesis: All else being equal, a stronger PE-bank 
relationship facilitates the lead bank’s information production about the borrower and 
thus allows a smaller lead bank share and a less concentrated lending syndicate.  
Nonetheless, it is possible that communication between the PE firm and the lead bank 
elevates the lead bank’s informational advantage over potential participant lenders, who could 
become more concerned about potential adverse selection problems.6 Information acquired by the 
lead bank via the PE firm-bank relationship channel could be “soft,” thereby not easily 
transferrable. When the participant banks do not have the same access to such information as the 
lead bank does, they could peg a large loan allocation as a “lemon” regardless of its true credit 
                                                          
Hilton deal, “Blackstone’s $26 Billion Hilton Deal: The Best Leveraged Buyout Ever”, in Bloomberg Businessweek 
(September 11, 2014), for more details. Three Blackstone-affiliated directors remained on the board nearly one year 
after Hilton’s IPO. So it is very plausible that, in any post-IPO lending to Hilton, the lenders would benefit from their 
relationships with Blackstone and from Blackstone’s soft information and influence on Hilton. 
5 We hand-collected lead PE firms’ equity ownership data from SEC filings at the time of loan inceptions. Among the 
291 loans, we were able to identify PE sponsor’s equity ownerships of 226 loans. The mean (median) equity holding 
of PE firm is 29.5% (22.2%). 
6 Relationships and communications with a third-party PE firm can help reduce the “distance” between the lead bank 
and the borrower (e.g., Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). 
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quality. If this adverse selection concern prevails, the lead bank must keep a large share of the loan 
to certify the loan quality. Therefore, a stronger PE-bank relationship would be associated with a 
larger lead bank holding of the loan. This leads to our alternative hypothesis, which we call the 
exclusive informational advantage hypothesis: 
H2: Exclusive Informational Advantage Hypothesis: All else being equal, a stronger PE-
bank relationship aggravates the potential participant banks’ concern about getting 
greater allocations of a lower quality loan, so the lead bank has to retain a larger share 
of the loan and form a more concentrated lending syndicate. 
3. Data, variable definitions, and summary statistics 
3.1 Data  
To construct our sample, we start with 97,731 bank loans (a.k.a., facilities) to U.S. 
companies with an origination year between 1995 and 2011 in the DealScan database.7 Among 
them, 34,687 facilities can be linked to the Compustat Annual database and the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) database and have key Compustat and CRSP data available in the fiscal 
year prior to the facility start date.8 We match these loan facilities to Thomson Reuters IPO data 
and find IPO information for 17,332 facilities. Information for the founding year of the IPO 
company is available for 17,224 facilities.9 Key facility characteristics (facility amount, maturity, 
yield spread, performance pricing, and secured status) are available for 11,026 facilities. Among 
                                                          
7 Multiple facilities can belong to the same loan package. All facilities in a package share the same contract terms such 
as covenants, but they differ in loan type (e.g., credit lines and term loans), maturity, yield spreads, and other features. 
Lender identities and their funding contributions are available at the facility level, so we focus on facilities. 
8 We downloaded the DealScan database from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) in May 2013, together 
with the August 2012 version of the DealScan-Compustat link file. See Chava and Roberts (2008) for details about 
the link file. DealScan includes loans to private companies, which are excluded when CRSP data are required. 
9 The founding date of a RLBO company is the founding date of its predecessor company (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). 
We thank Jay Ritter for sharing the IPO founding year data.  
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them, we keep 4,223 facilities that are made within five years after the IPO.10 We examine loans 
within five years after the IPO because PE firms have a reduced influence on their portfolio 
companies as the time goes on. We require the IPO date to fall between 1995-2011 because the 
SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) filing information 
became available from 1995. As a result, we are able to collect and verify information on PE 
sponsors from the IPO prospectus. This requirement allows us to retain 2,973 of the 4,223 facilities.  
For each of the 2,973 facilities, we follow Ivashina (2009) and Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, 
and Srinivasan (2011) to identify its lead arranging bank(s). More specifically, if an administrative 
agent of a facility is identified, it is defined as the lead bank. If the syndicate does not have an 
administrative agent, lenders carrying the titles of agent, arranger, book-runner, lead arranger, lead 
bank, or lead manager are defined as the lead bank(s). We keep 2,920 facilities whose lead bank’s 
role can be identified and whose market share information (as a proxy of reputation) can be 
computed. Of the 2,920 facilities, 824 facilities are made to PE-backed IPO companies.   
Our analysis on the lead bank share requires a measure for the lead bank’s contribution of 
funds as a fraction of the total facility amount. The DealScan database reports the number of 
lenders in a facility. For the facilities with only one lender, we set the lead bank share to 100%. 
The DealScan database provides information on the fraction, or share, of a facility amount 
contributed by each lender, but such information is unavailable for many facilities in the original 
database. Among the 2,920 facilities, 1,627 facilities have lender share information, including 291 
facilities to 151 unique PE-backed IPO companies and 1,336 facilities to 759 non-PE-backed IPO 
                                                          
10 Most loans during the first year after the IPO are also excluded because we require stock returns over the 200 trading 
days ending 11 days prior to the loan start date to compute the beta coefficient and the return volatility of each 
borrower’s stock. 
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companies.11 Our analysis focuses on the 291 facilities to PE-backed IPO companies. 
Our focus on the post-IPO loan sample rather than LBO loans extends the literature on 
relationship banking and the role of private equity firms. First, PE firms on average have lower 
equity ownership in their portfolio companies in the first several years after the IPO than at the 
LBO. It is important to know whether PE firms continue to play an important role in alleviating 
information asymmetry problems facing their portfolio companies after the IPO when they have 
lower equity ownership. Second, the IPO of a company entails substantial changes in the 
company’s informational environment, its bargaining power with regard to its lenders, the 
secondary trading market for its loans, and its ownership structure (e.g., Schenone, 2010; Saunders 
and Steffen, 2011). Whether a PE-bank relationship brings about benefits to public firms remains 
an open empirical question. Finally, the better availability of firm-level data in the post-IPO era 
enables us to control for a broader set of borrower characteristics as they have been shown to affect 
syndicate structures.  
3.2 Variable definitions 
Following the literature, we construct two measures of PE-bank relationship strength (e.g., 
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2007, 2011; Ivashina and Kovner, 2011). Our main 
measure, PE-Bank Relationship ($), is based on the dollar amount of previous loans. Suppose an 
IPO company takes a loan for which the lead bank is m. The company’s IPO was sponsored by PE 
firm k. For this specific loan, PE firm k’s prior relationship with bank m is equal to the total dollar 
amount of loans sponsored by PE firm k from lead bank m of the current facility in the past five 
years scaled by the total dollar amount of loans sponsored by PE firm k in the past five years, using 
                                                          
11 There are cases where shares of only some (but not all) lenders within a facility are reported. To ensure accuracy, 
we exclude such cases from our sample. We also drop those facilities with obviously incorrect lender share information 
(e.g. those facilities when lender shares add up to far more than 100%). 
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all sponsored loans in the DealScan database. The second measure, PE-Bank Relationship (#), is 
based on the number of previous loans. It is equal to the total number of loans sponsored by PE 
firm k from lead bank m of the current facility in the past five years divided by the number of loan 
facilities sponsored by PE firm k in the past five years.12  
An IPO company is sometimes backed by several PE firms (i.e., club deals). In these cases, 
the PE-Bank Relationship is the relationship between the primary PE sponsor and the lead bank. 
We define the primary PE sponsor as the one that has the largest equity stake in the company 
among all PE sponsors at the time of the IPO. If several PE sponsors have the same largest equity 
stake, we use the first one listed in the IPO prospectus. Our definition of a PE-bank relationship 
does not differentiate between individual funds under the same PE firm. For example, we would 
give “Castle Harlan Partners” 40% equity ownership if “Castle Harlan Partners II” fund has 10% 
and “Castle Harlan Partners IV” fund has 30% in an IPO company. Also, we follow Ivashina and 
Kovner (2011) to use the highest PE-Bank Relationship value when there are multiple lead banks 
in a facility.  
The dependent variables in our regressions are the lead bank’s share of the loan, syndicate 
concentration (measured by the Herfindahl index), syndicate size, foreign lender participation, and 
time-on-the-market (defined in Section 4.5). Their definitions, along with those of the explanatory 
variables, can be found in Appendix A1. 
 
                                                          
12 PE sponsor names for each IPO company are hand-collected from the IPO prospectus and cross-checked with and 
matched to the DealScan loan sponsor names. We only include loans with PE firm k being listed as a loan sponsor 
when we calculate the relationship measure between PE firm k and bank m. That is, we do not include non-sponsored 
post-IPO loans to PE-backed IPO companies. We do so for two reasons. First, including these loans is unlikely to 
materially change our PE-bank relationship measures, because the number  of sponsored loans in DealScan is much 
larger than the number of non-sponsored post-IPO loans to PE-backed IPO companies and because LBO loans are 
often larger than other loans. Second, the relationship measures based on sponsored loans are consistent with the 
literature (e.g., Ivashina and Kovner, 2011), and this makes our results more comparable. 
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3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the full sample of 1,627 loans for which we have 
lender share information. We also report the summary statistics for the loans to PE-backed and 
non-PE-backed IPO companies separately. The Lead Bank Share is the fraction of a loan facility 
held by the lead bank. The mean value of this variable is 0.73 and the median value is 1 for the 
full sample.13 Both the mean and the median values of the lead bank share are smaller for the loans 
to PE-backed companies than those for the loans to non-PE-backed companies. A similar pattern 
is observed for the Herfindahl Index of lender shares in a facility.  
The mean value of No. of All Lenders per facility is 4.07 for the full sample. The loans to 
PE-backed companies tend to have a larger syndicate than the loans to non-PE-backed companies. 
A foreign lender is a participant lender for 20% of the loan facilities in the full sample. A foreign 
lender is more likely to be a participant lender for the loans to PE-backed IPO companies than for 
the loans to non-PE-backed IPO companies.  
The average All-In-Spread Drawn for the full sample is 241.20 basis points. On average, 
PE-backed IPO companies carry a lower overall loan cost than other IPO companies.14 On average, 
the loans to PE-backed companies are larger and have longer maturities than those to other IPO 
companies.  
In summary, relative to the loans to other IPO companies, the loans to PE-backed IPO 
companies are larger, and have lower yield spreads, longer maturity, a lower lead bank share, a 
larger and more concentrated syndicate, and a higher probability of foreign bank participation. 
                                                          
13 Our average lead bank share is larger than those reported in Sufi (2007) and Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli (2011) 
for two reasons. First, we set the lead bank share to 100% if the lead bank share is missing and the number of lenders 
equals one, while they exclude all loans when the lead bank share is missing. Second, the size of loans in our sample 
is much smaller than that in theirs.  
14 In unreported regressions, we find that PE sponsorships and PE-bank relationships help lower the net loan yield 
spreads (the all-in-spreads after upfront fees), but there exists no significant relations between PE-bank relationships 
and the all-in-spreads. 
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These results suggest that banks share some of the benefits of PE-bank relationships with 
borrowers. 
The average value of the continuous measure for the PE-bank relationship constructed 
using the dollar amount, PE-Bank Relationship ($), is 0.13 for the subsample of 291 loans to PE-
backed companies with non-missing lender share information. The continuous measure for the PE-
bank relationship has similar mean values when it is constructed using the number of deals. The 
lenders to PE-backed IPO companies have a larger market share (Lead Lender Reputation) and are 
more likely to have a prior lending relationship with the borrowers (i.e., a smaller mean value for 
the New Lender Dummy).  
Table 1 also reports the summary statistics of key borrower-specific characteristics at the 
time of loan origination. With an average age of 18.26 years, the companies in our full sample tend 
to be younger than the bond issuers in Huang, Ritter, and Zhang (2016). This is consistent with 
Diamond (1989), who reports that younger companies tend to use private bank debt. On average, 
PE-backed IPO companies have higher leverage than other IPO companies, consistent with the 
conjecture that PE-bank relationships allow PE-backed companies to borrow more.  
4. Regression results 
4.1 PE-bank relationship and syndicate structure: Baseline regressions 
We first estimate our baseline ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the effect of PE-
bank relationships on loan syndicate structures for the sample of the 291 loans to PE-sponsored 
IPO companies. The analysis using the PE-backed sample provides a cleaner test of the PE-bank 
relationship effect because we can largely ignore possible differences in loan syndicate structure 
caused by the general effect of a PE firm.  
Table 2 reports the results. In all regressions in this table, as well as in the subsequent tables, 
15 
 
we take advantage of the financial data availability for these IPO companies in our sample and 
control for many company-level proxies for borrower risk. We also include year dummies to 
capture changes in the macroeconomic environment, and Fama-French 17 industry dummies to 
control for industry effects.15 Loan type and deal package purpose fixed effects are also included 
to account for differences among loans that are used for diverse corporate aims. For brevity, the 
coefficients on these dummy variables are not reported. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the estimated effect of PE-bank relationships on the share held 
by the lead bank. In model (1), we use the continuous measure of prior lending relationship 
between the PE firm and the lead bank, PE-Bank Relationship ($). The coefficient on this variable 
is -0.28 and is statistically significant at the one percent level. This result suggests that, after 
controlling for observable borrower characteristics, a stronger prior PE-bank relationship results 
in a significantly smaller share held by the lead bank in the loan. We find a similar effect if we use 
the PE-Bank Relationship (#) as an alternative measure of relationship strength in model (2). These 
results are consistent with the efficient information production hypothesis.  
The coefficient on PE-Bank Relationship ($) in model (1) is also economically meaningful. 
A one-standard-deviation increase in the PE-Bank Relationship ($), which is 0.23 as reported in 
Table 1, decreases the share of the lead bank by 0.28×0.23=6.44%. Given that the average amount 
for the sample of loans to PE-sponsored IPO companies is about $215.81 million, a 6.44% decrease 
in the lead bank share is roughly equivalent to a $13.9 million reduction of required capital 
contribution by the lead bank. In the syndicated loans market, a bank’s capital level is shown to 
                                                          
15 The lead bank that has a strong relationship with the borrower’s PE firm could have too much exposure to the PE 
firm’s portfolio companies. Consequently, the lead bank could have an incentive to reduce its share of the loan to the 
PE-backed borrower. Our controls for borrower risk, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects should help alleviate 
such risk-management influences on our major results on the role of PE-bank relationships in alleviating information 
asymmetry problems in lending. 
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have a significant effect on the size of funding that the bank can contribute to a loan (Chu, Zhang, 
and Zhao, 2017). For our sample, a bank can use $1.1 billion in capital to fund ten loans on average 
for PE-backed IPO companies (the average contribution of funding is $110 million, or 51% of the 
average loan size of $215.8 million as reported in Table 1). If the bank can use $13.9 million less 
of its capital for a loan, $1.1 billion would fund 11.5 loans. Banks rely on relationships with 
borrowers and cross-selling, as the risk-return tradeoff for a loan on a stand-alone basis is often 
not attractive for the bank due to capital regulations (S&P, 2016). The 15% increase from 10 to 
11.5 loans can benefit the bank as it can gain more opportunities to establish relationships with 
borrowers. 
PE-bank relationships can also benefit the borrower by increasing its credit supply. If the 
lead bank can only contribute $110 million (51% of a $215.8 million loan), a reduction in lead 
bank share from 51% to 44.56% implies that the loan size will be increased from $215.8 million 
to $246.9 million. A $31 million increase in credit supply can be important for an IPO company.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports similar effects of PE-bank relationships using the Herfindahl 
Index. This finding again supports the efficient information production hypothesis: When a strong 
PE-bank relationship facilitates information acquisition, the lead bank can form a less concentrated 
syndicate (i.e., have a broader loan investor base). In summary, the baseline results reported in 
Table 2 suggest that PE-bank relationships can facilitate information production in lending, and 
can benefit both the lead bank (more lending and cross-selling opportunities) and the borrowing 
company (greater credit supply).  
4.2 PE-bank relationship and syndicate structure: Expanded regressions 
In this subsection, we estimate expanded regressions to address some concerns about other 
confounding factors that could drive our baseline results. First, it is possible that both the borrower 
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and the PE firm have a relationship with the lead bank. We check to see whether the PE-bank 
relationship is important after controlling for the borrower-bank relationship.16  
Second, the reputation concern of a lead bank could deter it from shirking monitoring 
(Diamond, 1989; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). A lender’s good reputation can also certify its 
ability of information collection as well as the quality of a borrower. Thus, we control for a lender’s 
market share in the syndicated loan market in dollar amount in the five years prior to the current 
loan as a proxy for the lender’s reputation. Another reason to control for lender reputation is that 
this variable could be correlated with PE-bank relationships because a lender with a larger market 
share would naturally have a higher probability to be selected as the lead bank in a deal.  
Third, a lead bank can use certain loan characteristics as alternative means to demonstrate 
its commitment to information collection and monitoring (e.g., Rajan and Winton, 1995; Cerqueiro, 
Ongena, and Roszbach, 2016). If PE-bank relationships affect the lead bank’s incentive to acquire 
information, they could influence the usage of covenants and collateral. Thus, we control for loan 
covenants and collateral requirements to avoid the potential problem of omitted variables . A lead 
bank will probably hold a smaller share when the loan is larger (Sufi, 2007). If some banks lead 
larger loan deals more often, they could form stronger relationships with PE firms, resulting in a 
negative relation between PE-bank relationships and the lead bank share. Thus, we control for loan 
size to alleviate such effects.  
Finally, we control for a PE firm’s reputation in the syndicated loans market. A PE firm 
would become more recognized as they repeatedly access the loan market. A PE firm with good 
                                                          
16 In our sample, PE-backed IPO companies include those that had been through leveraged buyouts and those that had 
never been public before the IPO. A borrower, especially a company that had never been public before the IPO, could 
have developed a relationship with a bank through the help of the borrower’s PE sponsor.  Therefore, borrower-bank 
relationships at least partially capture the effect of PE-bank relationships. Our controlling for the borrower-bank 
relationship thus biases against us finding an effect for the PE-bank relationship. 
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reputation could also mitigate information asymmetry problems of the borrowing company 
(Demiroglu and James, 2010; Huang, Ritter, and Zhang, 2016). We use the natural log of total 
dollar amount of borrowing by a PE firm in the past five years to represent its reputation in the 
loan market and control for it in our regressions.  
We present the expanded regression results with the aforementioned additional control 
variables in Table 3. Before we discuss the results, note that our reduced-form baseline models in 
Table 2 have the advantage of avoiding potential endogeneity problems associated with the 
simultaneous determination of the aforementioned control variables and the dependent variable. 
In Table 3 we only report the results using the PE-bank relationship measures based on previous 
deal amounts. Our results using the relationship measures based on the number of previous deals 
are qualitatively similar.  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the regression results using the lead bank share as the dependent 
variable. The dependent variable in Panel B of Table 3 is the Herfindahl Index, with results similar 
to those in Panel A of Table 3. Our discussion will focus on Panel A of Table 3. Model (1) in Panel 
A of Table 3 is the same as model (1) in Table 2 except that we include a number of loan 
characteristics as additional control variables. We control for the Lead Lender Reputation, New 
Lender Dummy (as a control for borrower-bank relationship), and PE Firm Reputation in model 
(2) in Table 3. After controlling for observable loan characteristics, borrower-bank relationship, 
and bank and PE reputation, a strong PE-bank relationship still significantly reduces the lead bank 
share. The coefficients on the PE-Bank Relationship ($)  change little compared to those in Panel 
A of Table 2 and are still statistically significant at the one percent level.  
In model (2) of Panel A of Table 3, the coefficient on the New Lender Dummy is 0.12 and 
is statistically significant at the one percent level. This result indicates that, all else being equal, 
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lending to a new borrower requires the lead bank to hold more of the loan to signal commitment 
for information production. The coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is also statistically 
significant at the one percent level, suggesting that PE firm-bank relationship is at least as 
important as borrower-bank relationship in facilitating information production.  
The coefficients on the Lead Lender Reputation and PE Firm Reputation are negative but 
not statistically significant, providing some weak evidence that reputations of the lead bank and 
the PE sponsor could mitigate information asymmetry problems.  
4.3 Endogeneity of PE-bank relationships 
In this subsection, we conduct more robustness tests to show that our main findings are 
likely to be causal. First, we re-estimate both the baseline and the expanded regression models 
using a lead bank fixed effects model. The lead bank fixed effects model removes any effects that 
time-invariant bank characteristics might have on the association between PE-bank relationships 
and the lead bank share. We present the regression results in models (1) and (2) in Panel A of 
Table 4. Our main finding is robust to the inclusion of lead bank fixed effects.17 
In models (3) and (4) of Panel A of Table 4, we report the results using the PE firm fixed 
effects models. It is possible that some consistently good quality PE firms tend to have a stronger 
relationship with a particular bank (because the bank is willing to work closely with a good PE 
firm) and a good quality PE firm has a higher likelihood of being the backer of a sound IPO 
company. Hence, the association between PE-bank relationship and lead bank share we have 
discovered could merely reflect the unobservable PE firm quality. Using the PE sponsor fixed 
                                                          
17 The sample used in the regressions with lead-bank fixed effects has 287 observations, four observations less than 
the 291 observations in the early regressions. We use the average share of lead banks as the dependent variable when 
there are multiple lead banks in a facility in previous analysis. This presents a problem in the lead bank fixed effect 
model since we cannot determine which lead bank’s fixed effect to include. Thus, we only use the 287 loans with 
exactly one lead bank.   
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effects model, we are estimating the effect of within-PE variation in the relationship variable on 
the lead bank share, while controlling for time-invariant (both observable and unobservable) PE 
firm quality. The results after controlling for PE sponsor fixed effects, regardless of the model 
specifications, are in line with our previous results.18  
An endogeneity problem could also arise from the selection process of an IPO company-
bank pair. Although a PE firm is not necessarily in charge of choosing the lender for a portfolio 
company after the IPO, it could still propose its relationship bank(s) to its IPO companies. A PE 
firm could be inclined to recommend a relationship bank to an IPO company with publicly 
unobservable but better credit qualities that requires less efforts for due diligence and monitoring, 
resulting in a negative relation between our PE-bank relationship measure and the lead bank share. 
In this case, the strength of PE-bank relationships would relate to the unobservable qualities of the 
IPO company.19 We use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to deal with this endogeneity 
problem. The IV that we use is the highest bank relationship that a PE firm has immediately prior 
to the loan inception. This highest bank relationship value captures a PE firm’s propensity to use 
a relationship bank again in the current deal, but it is unrelated to the IPO company’s characteristics 
because it is pre-determined.20  
We present the two stage least square (2SLS) regression results in Panel B of Table 4. In 
                                                          
18 In unreported tests, we also include both lead bank and PE sponsor fixed effects. We find that the coefficient on the 
PE-Bank Relationship ($) remains negative but becomes statistically insignificant. Since we only have 291 
observations, the inclusion of both fixed effects substantially consumes the statistical power of these tests.   
19 In unreported results, we estimate IPO firm fixed effects models. Although the coefficient estimates on the PE-Bank 
relationship ($) are still negative, they are not statistically significant. This is likely due to the fact that few IPO 
companies have multiple loans in our sample. One could also argue that PE firms could bring more challenging deals 
to their relationship banks. Since more challenging deals would require the lead banks to retain a greater loan share, 
this argument suggests a positive effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank share. This positive effect biases 
against our findings, so this argument is not a concern for us. We also want to point out that the selection bias that we 
try to deal with using IVs can be weak, as a PE firm may not have a strong reason to bring a borrowing company with 
either a good quality or a more challenging deal to a certain relationship bank.  
20 In an unreported test, we obtain very similar results if we use the highest PE-bank relationship measured six months 
or one year prior to the loan inception.   
21 
 
models (1) and (3), we report the first stage regressions under the basic and expanded model 
specifications, respectively. In these first-stage regressions, the Highest Bank Relationship ($) is 
positively related to the dependent variable, PE-Bank Relationship ($). This is consistent with our 
conjecture that a PE firm that has traditionally relied on one or more relationship banks is more 
likely to choose a relationship bank in a subsequent deal. In models (2) and (4), we report the 
respective second stage regression results. The effect of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) on the lead 
bank’s share remains negative and statistically significant at the one or five percent levels, 
suggesting that potential endogeneity related to the selection of banks is not responsible for our 
early regression results in Tables 2 and 3. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-test statistic rejects the null 
hypothesis of weak instrument. 
4.4 Cross-sectional heterogeneity of PE-bank relationship effects 
Our efficient information production hypothesis suggests that PE-bank relationships would 
be more useful for less transparent companies, which require greater due diligence and monitoring 
costs. We shed further light on how the effect of PE-bank relationships on syndicate structure 
varies depending upon the borrowing company’s informational opaqueness.  
In Table 5, we consider three widely used proxies for information opaqueness of a 
borrowing company. The first proxy is average total asset size in the previous two years. A larger 
company has a relatively lower degree of information asymmetry. We partition our sample using 
the sample median of the average total assets and re-estimate the regressions for the two 
subsamples separately. In Panel A, it is clear that the effect of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) on the 
lead bank share is much stronger among smaller IPO companies. For smaller IPO companies that 
require more costly information production, having their PE sponsors connected with the lead 
banks significantly reduces the loan shares that the lead banks need to hold. 
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The other two proxies for ex ante information asymmetry are constructed according to an 
IPO company’s research analyst coverage. We obtain analyst coverage data from the Thomas 
Reuters I/B/E/S database and calculate the standard deviations of analyst recommendations and 
analyst earnings-per-share (EPS) fiscal year 1 (FY1) forecasts for the year prior to the loan 
inception. We use analyst recommendations and EPS forecasts that were issued before a loan 
inception date and are still valid by the time of the loan inception. A more opaque company should 
be associated with a greater dispersion in analyst recommendations or EPS forecasts. In Panel B 
and Panel C, we show that the effect of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) on the lead bank share is 
much more pronounced among companies for which the dispersion in analyst recommendations 
or the dispersion in EPS forecast is greater. These results again imply that the PE-bank relationship 
is a particularly important channel of information transmission among more informationally 
opaque companies. 
4.5 Syndicate size, foreign bank participation, and syndication speed  
So far, our results on the effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank share support  
our efficient information production hypothesis. We then examine the effect of PE-bank 
relationships on some related syndicate characteristics, controlling for the effects of other variables. 
Table 6 reports the results. Our discussions below focus on the effect of PE-bank relationships. 
First, we examine syndicate size as an alternative measure of syndicate concentration. 
Panel A in Table 6 reports the estimation results. The dependent variable is the total number of 
lenders of a loan facility. Because this variable is a count number, we estimate Poisson 
regressions.21 In column (1) of Panel A, we estimate the baseline model. The coefficient on the 
                                                          
21 We retain loans which have only one lead bank. We also winsorize the total number of lenders at 10 (i.e., for loans 
with more than 10 lenders, we set the total number of lenders to 10).   
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PE-Bank Relationship ($) is positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level. 
Economically, a one-standard-deviation increase in this variable (0.23) increases the total number 
of lenders by 0.38 (0.23×0.32×5.14 = 0.38). In column (2) of Panel A, where an expanded model 
with additional control variables is estimated, the coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) 
remains positive and statistically significant at the ten percent level. These results suggest that a 
stronger PE-bank relationship is associated with a greater number of participant lenders, providing 
further support for the efficient information production hypothesis.  
Next, we explore the effect of PE-bank relationships on loan syndicate composition to offer 
additional insight into how PE-bank relationships mitigate information asymmetry-related issues. 
We focus on one feature of syndicate composition – the participation of foreign lenders in a 
syndicate. Because foreign banks are geographically farther away, they are presumably more 
sensitive to asymmetric information issues when they participate in syndicated lending to U.S. 
borrowers (Stein, 2002; Esty, 2004; Sufi, 2007; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2012). Thus, we 
conjecture that a strong PE-bank relationship is associated with a greater chance of having one or 
more foreign lenders in the syndicate as it helps alleviate information asymmetries between the 
borrower and its lenders. We estimate a Logit model to assess the effect of PE-lead bank 
relationships on the probability of having a foreign participant lender.22  
We present the regression results in Panel B of Table 6. For the baseline model in column 
(3), the coefficient on the variable PE-Bank Relationship ($) is positive and statistically significant 
at the ten percent level. Economically, if we change the actual value of this variable for each 
observation from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above its actual value, 
                                                          
22 Among the 291 facilities to PE-backed IPO companies, about 37.1% of them have one or more foreign lender 
presence. A foreign lender is present for approximately 19.6% of the full sample of the 1,627 facilities to both PE-
backed and non-PE backed IPO companies.   
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without changing the actual values of other independent variables, the predicted average likelihood 
of foreign lender participation increases by about 30.3% (e.g., from 10% to 40.3%). In column (4) 
with additional controls, the coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) remains positive and 
becomes statistically significant at the one percent level. These findings indicate that a stronger 
PE-bank relationship significantly increases the odds of having a foreign lender in the syndicate, 
again consistent with the notion that PE-bank relationships mitigate information asymmetry-
related issues in lending.23  
Finally, we study the speed of the loan syndication process to provide additional evidence 
on the effect of a PE-bank relationship. Ivashina and Sun (2011) suggest that time-on-the-market 
(TOM), which is defined as the number of days from the start of syndication to the completion of 
a loan, captures the demand for the loan. We conjecture that, if other potential lenders acknowledge 
that the lead bank’s relationship with the PE firm lowers the cost of information production and 
monitoring and, as a result, the lead bank’s moral hazard issue is of less concerns, they will bid 
more aggressively for the loan and the overall loan demand would be greater. Thus, all else being 
equal, a stronger PE-bank relationship will be related to a shorter TOM for the loan.   
In Panel C of Table 6, we regress TOM on PE-Bank Relationship ($) along with the control 
variables. Because the number of days is an integer count number greater than zero, we again 
estimate Poisson regressions. Also, due to the fact that a large portion of time-on-the-market 
information is missing in DealScan, we do not require a loan to have non-missing lead bank share 
to include it in this sample. We also include the loans to non-PE backed IPO companies to ensure 
that we have a reasonable sample size. To control for the difference between the PE-backed and 
                                                          
23 In untabulated analysis of the sample of 824 loans to PE-backed IPO companies without requiring lead lender share 
information, we also find evidence that a stronger PE-bank relationship is associated with a larger syndicate size and 
a higher likelihood of foreign bank participation in the syndicate. 
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non-PE backed loans, we add a dummy control variable, PE Sponsor Dummy, to indicate whether 
a loan is to a PE-backed IPO company (=1) or not (=0). For the loans to non-PE backed IPO 
companies, their PE-bank relationships are set to zero. From the regression results in Panel C of 
Table 6, we can see that a stronger PE-bank relationship does lead to a shorter syndication process. 
The coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is negative and statistically significant at the ten 
and five percent levels in column (5) and column (6), respectively. Economically, a one-standard-
deviation increase in this variable decreases loan syndication time by over 10% or 3.21 days 
(0.23×(-0.45)×31.05=-3.21) in column (5). The fact that a stronger PE-bank relationship results in 
a shorter loan syndication time adds further support to  our efficient information production 
hypothesis.  
4.6 PE-bank relationship and lead bank share: More robustness checks  
We present an array of additional robustness checks in Table 7. To save space, we only 
report the results using the expanded OLS specification. Using the baseline model specification 
yields very similar results.  
We first investigate whether the negative effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank 
share is caused by the joint lending and underwriting relationships between the borrower and the 
lead bank. A company can use the same bank for both borrowing and underwriting (see, e.g., 
Drucker and Puri, 2005; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2007). To rule out the 
possibility that this underwriting channel is the main driver for our early results, we check whether 
the lead bank was also a lead underwriter of the borrowing company’s IPO for each of the 291 
loans to PE-backed companies. There are 38 loans that have overlapping lead banks/underwriters.   
We include a dummy variable, Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy, in our 
expanded regression for the sample of loans to PE-backed IPO companies as a control variable. 
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The Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy variable equals one if the lead bank of the 
current loan was the lead or one of the lead underwriters of the borrowing company’s IPO, and it 
is set to zero otherwise. We report the regression results in Panel A of Table 7. The coefficient on 
the Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy variable is not statistically significant. The 
coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is virtually the same as in Table 3. These results 
suggest that the underwriting channel cannot explain our earlier results.  
It is possible that PE firms also have relationships with participant lenders. These 
relationships could also alleviate information asymmetry problems in lending (Sufi, 2007). In 
Panel B of Table 7, we check to see whether these relationships drive our earlier results on the PE 
sponsor’s relationships with the lead bank. For each participant lender in a loan, we compute a 
similar measure for its relationships with the PE sponsor as the ratio of the dollar amount of loans 
from this particular bank to this PE firm’s portfolio companies over the dollar amount of all loans 
to the PE firm’s portfolio companies during the past five years. We set the PE-Participant 
Relationship ($) to the maximum relationship measure for all participant lenders in the loan, and 
set it to zero for sole lender loans. The effect of the PE firm’s relationships on the lead bank share 
is qualitatively similar whether we control for the PE firm’s relationships with the participant 
banks or not.24  
In Panel C of Table 7, we show that the effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank 
share is robust to the usage of a Tobit model that deals with a censored dependent variable.25 In 
Panel D of Table 7, we present the package level results. We regress the package level bank share 
                                                          
24 A large PE firm can have relationships with many banks and such relationships make the participation of these 
banks in the syndicate more likely. We  control for the reputation of the PE firm in our expanded regressions, although 
it has little effect on syndicate structure measures. More importantly, such network of relationships does not explain 
why the relationships between the lead bank and the PE sponsor reduce the lead bank share. 
25 The original dependent variable, Lead Bank Share, has a lower limit of 0 and an upper limit of 1. Although it is 
unlikely that any artificial censoring is involved, we still make sure that our results are robust.  
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on a PE-bank relationship measure and the control variables. The 291 facilities made to PE-backed 
IPO companies correspond to 187 packages. From Panel D of Table 7, we can see that the package 
level estimation results are, qualitatively and quantitatively, similar to the facility level results.26 
In Panels E and F of Table 7, we that our finding remains intact if we focus on revolving credit 
lines and term loans separately.  
Additionally, we examine the effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank share for a 
subsample of leveraged facilities.27 If a strong PE-bank relationship lessens the participant banks’ 
concern about the lead bank’s moral hazard problem, we expect this effect to be more pronounced 
among leveraged facilities since riskier borrowers require more intensive screening and monitoring. 
Compared with the previous estimation results using all loan facilities, the estimated coefficients 
on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) for the leveraged subsample remain negative and increase in their 
economic and statistical significance. Also, our initial measure for a PE firm’s reputation is the 
total dollar amount of loans sponsored by the PE firm in the past five years. This measure could 
be subject to fluctuations in the volume of the LBO market across time. To remove the time-series 
effect, we scale the initial measure by the total amount of sponsored loans by all PE firms in the 
past five years. Our major results remain essentially the same. The results using the Herfindahl 
Index as the dependent variable are also robust. Some PE firms have direct affiliations with banks 
(Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner, 2013). Our major results are essentially the same whether or not we 
control for PE-lead bank affiliations. For brevity, these results are not tabulated but are available 
upon request. 
 
                                                          
26 Our facility level regressions correct the standard errors for clustering at the borrower level. Our major facility level 
results are essentially the same if we correct the standard errors for clustering at the package level instead.  
27 We consider a loan facility to be leveraged if, in the DealScan database, its market segment is marked as either 
“Leveraged”, “Highly Leveraged”, or “Non-investment Grade”. 
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4.7 PE-bank relationship and lead bank share: Larger sample results  
In Table 8, we examine whether our main results on the lead lender share still hold in a 
broader sample that includes non-PE backed IPO companies. We include the same control 
variables as in Table 2 (for the baseline model in the first two columns) or Table 3 (for the 
expanded model in the last two columns). For brevity, the coefficients on the control variables are 
not reported.  
In column (1) of Table 8, we examine the effect of the PE firm’s IPO sponsorship on the 
lead bank share, regardless of the strength of PE-bank relationships. The PE Sponsor Dummy is 
set to one if the borrowing company’s IPO is backed by a PE firm, and zero otherwise. The 
coefficient on the PE Sponsor Dummy is -0.10 and is statistically significant at the one percent 
level, suggesting that having PE sponsorship at the IPO on average reduces the lead bank’s share 
of a post-IPO loan facility by 10% (e.g., from 61% to 51%). In column (2) of Table 8, we create 
two dummy variables to represent strong and weak PE-bank relationships. The Strong Relationship 
Dummy ($) equals one if the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is greater than or equal to 21%, and zero 
otherwise. The Weak Relationship Dummy ($) equals one if the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is less 
than 21% for loans to PE-backed companies, and is set to zero if the loan is to a non-PE-backed 
company or the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is greater than or equal to 21%. The regression uses the 
loans to non-PE-backed IPOs as the reference group. We choose as the cutoff point the mean value 
(21%) of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) for all of the 824 loans by the PE-sponsored companies in 
the sample of 2,920 loan facilities for which lead banks can be identified (some of these loans do 
not have lead bank share information). We use these dummy variables to alleviate the effect of 
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potential nonlinearity associated with the continuous PE-bank relationship measure that is more of 
a concern when both PE-backed and non-PE-backed IPO companies are included in the sample.28  
As reported in column (2) of Table 8, the coefficient on the Strong Relationship Dummy 
($) is -0.21 and is statistically significant at the one percent level. This result suggests that, 
compared with those to other IPO companies, the lead banks of the loans to PE-backed IPO 
companies hold 21% less (e.g., from 72% to 51%) when the lead banks have a strong relationship 
with the PE sponsors. On the other hand, the Weak Relationship Dummy ($) has a coefficient of -
0.08, which is statistically significant at the five percent level. It means that a moderate relationship 
between the PE sponsor and the lead bank can still reduce the lead bank share, yet by a much 
smaller amount.  
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 8, we include additional control variables such as the Lead 
Lender Reputation, New Lender Dummy, PE Firm Reputation, and loan characteristics. In model 
(3), the coefficient on the PE Sponsor Dummy is still negative but becomes statistically 
insignificant. Nevertheless, in model (4), the coefficient on the Strong Relationship Dummy ($) is 
negative and statistically significant at the ten percent level.29  
5. Conclusions 
Private equity (PE) firms are an important player in the economy. They have significant 
equity stakes in many companies, and interact frequently and develop relationships with banks. 
Using a sample of bank loans to IPO companies, we find that a stronger PE-lead bank relationship 
                                                          
28 We also use the continuous measure PE-Bank Relationship ($), together with the PE dummy, for the larger 
sample of both PE- and non-PE-sponsored IPOs. The coefficient on the PE-Bank Relationship ($) is negative but 
only statistically significant at the ten percent level. We set the PE-Bank Relationship ($) to zero for all non-PE-
sponsored IPOs. The decrease in statistical significance suggests that the PE-bank relationship has a nonlinear effect 
on the lead bank share. 
29 In the un-tabulated analysis of syndicate size and foreign lender participation using the sample of 2,920 loans 
without requiring leader lender share information, we also find that a stronger PE-bank relationship is associated with 
a larger syndicate size and a higher likelihood of foreign bank participation in the syndicate. 
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allows the lead bank to hold a significantly smaller fraction of a loan to a PE-sponsored company 
and form a significantly larger and less concentrated syndicate. The likelihood of foreign bank 
participation in a syndicate also increases with the strength of a PE-bank relationship. These 
findings are robust to different measures of PE-bank relationship and to the control of the lead 
bank reputation, the PE sponsor reputation, the lead bank- and PE- fixed effects, the lead bank’s 
underwriting relationships with the borrower, and the PE sponsor’s relationships with the 
participant lenders. PE-bank relationships are also more important for more informationally 
opaque borrowers. These findings provide strong support for our efficient information production 
hypothesis that PE-bank relationships facilitate efficient information production and mitigate 
information asymmetry-related problems in lending. 
The literature on relationship banking focuses on the direct bilateral relationship between 
the borrower and the lender (e.g., Boot, 2000; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2007, 
2011). We contribute to the literature by showing that a close past lending relationship between a 
borrower’s lead bank and a third-party financial sponsor also facilitates the lead bank’s information 
acquisition about the borrower. The enhanced efficiency in information production helps banks to 
expand lending in the syndicated loans market as they can provide less capital for loans that they 
arrange. Borrowing companies also benefit from such bank-third party relationships as they gain 
better access to credit.   
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Appendix A1 
 
Variable definitions 
 
This appendix contains the detailed variable definitions. For some of the variables in this appendix, their 
natural logarithms are used in the regressions. Ln(X) denotes the natural logarithm of variable X. 
Variable Name Detailed Definition 
No. of All (Participant) Lenders The total number of all lenders (participant lenders, excluding lead) in the 
syndicate of the loan facility. 
Lead Bank Share The lead lender’s share of the dollar amount of the loan facility. If the syndicate 
has more than one lead lender, this is the average share of the lead lenders. To 
increase the number of usable observations, we set the Lead Bank Share to 
100% if No. of All Lenders equals one. 
Herfindahl Index The Herfindahl index of lenders’ shares in the loan facility, computed as the sum 
of the squares of each lender’s share in the loan.  
Foreign Bank Dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility has a non-U.S. bank as a 
participant bank according to DealScan, and equals zero otherwise.  
Time-on-the-Market (TOM) Number of days from the start of the syndication to the completion of the loan 
PE-Bank Relationship ($) For a loan to a PE-backed company, the dollar-based relationship measure is 
defined as the ratio of the total dollar amount of loans sponsored by the PE firm 
and from the lead bank of the current loan facility in the past five years scaled by 
the total dollar amount of loans sponsored by the same PE firm in the past five 
years (regardless of lead banks). This measure is set zero for all loans to non-PE-
backed companies. 
Strong Relationship Dummy ($) This dummy variable equals one if PE-Bank Relationship ($) is greater than or 
equal to 21%, and zero otherwise. 
Weak Relationship Dummy ($) For a loan to a PE-backed company, this dummy variable equals one if PE-Bank 
Relationship ($) is less than 21%, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable is set 
zero for loans to non-PE-backed companies. 
PE-Bank Relationship (#) This continuous relationship measure is defined in the same way as PE-Bank 
Relationship ($) except that the number of loans instead of the loan amount is 
used in calculating the ratio. 
PE-Participant Relationship ($) For a participant bank in a loan, we first compute a measure for the participant 
bank’s relationship with the PE firm as the ratio of the total dollar amount of 
loans with this participant bank as the lead bank and with the PE firm as a 
sponsor in the past five years scaled by the total dollar amount of loans with the 
same PE firm as a sponsor in the past five years (regardless of lead banks). PE-
Participant Relationship ($) equals the maximum relationship measure for all 
participant lenders in the loan, and equals zero for sole lender loans. 
Highest Bank Relationship ($) The highest value of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) for the PE sponsor of the 
borrowing IPO company with any banks prior to the current loan 
All-In-Spread Drawn (bps) The spread the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn 
down. It adds the yield spread of the loan with any annual (or facility) fee paid 
to the bank group. 
Loan Amount ($m) The actual amount of the loan facility committed by the facility’s lender pool, in 
millions of dollars of the 2011 purchasing power. 
Maturity The number of months the facility will be active from the start date to the 
expiration date. 
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Appendix A1: Continued. 
Variable Name Detailed Definition 
Secured Loan Dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility is secured, and equals zero 
otherwise. 
Performance Pricing Dummy A dummy variable that equals one if there is a grid displaying different pricing 
levels based on a predefined trigger such as a company’s ratings and ratios, and 
equals zero otherwise.  
No. of Fin. Covenants The total number of covenants based on financial ratios (see Appendix A2). We 
first create a dummy variable that equals one if a financial ratio covenant exists, 
and equals zero otherwise. To avoid losing too many observations, we set the 
dummy variable to zero if there is no covenant based on a financial ratio or 
information about it is missing. We add up the dummy variables to obtain the 
number of financial covenants. 
No. of Non-Fin. Covenants The total number of non-financial covenants (see Appendix A2). This variable is 
constructed in the same way as No. of Fin. Covenants based on non-financial 
ratio covenants. 
Loan Type Dummies Including (1) 364-Day Dummy, (2) Revolver (<1 Year) Dummy, (3) Revolver 
(≥1 Year) Dummy, (4) Term Loan Dummy, (5) Term Loan A Dummy, and (6) 
Term Loan B-G Dummy. The omitted group includes all other much less 
common loan types (e.g. “Bridge Loan”, “Delay Draw Term Loan”, “Note”, 
“Other Loan”, “Revolver/Term Loan”, and “Standby Letter of Credit”, among 
others). The group definition follows Drucker and Puri (2009). 
Deal Purpose Dummies Including (1) Acquire Dummy, (2) General Dummy, (3) LBO Dummy, and (4) 
Recap Dummy. The omitted group includes “Miscellaneous” and “Other” 
purposes. The group definition follows Drucker and Puri (2009). 
PE Sponsor Dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the borrower was a PE-backed company at 
the IPO, and equals zero otherwise. 
Lead Lender Reputation Measured by the lead lender market share, which is the total amount of all loans 
for which the lead lender of the current loan was also a lead lender divided by 
the total amount of loans in the DealScan universe during the five years prior to 
the current loan’s start date. If there are multiple lead lenders for the current 
loan, the maximum lender market share is used. 
New Lender Dummy A dummy variable that equals one if none of the lead lenders is a lead lender in 
the loans by the same borrower during the five years prior to the current loan’s 
start date, and equals zero otherwise. 
PE Firm Reputation Ln(1+ the total amount of borrowing sponsored by the PE firm over the past five 
years, in millions of dollars of the 2011 purchasing power). 
Market Cap. ($m) Market capitalization (Compustat items CSHO × TEM PRCC_F) of the 
borrower at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the loan start date, in 
millions of dollars of the 2011 purchasing power.  
Market-to-Book  The sum of the market value of equity (items CSHO × PRCC_F) and the book 
value of debt (items LT + PSTKL – TXDITC) divided by the book value of total 
assets (item AT) at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the loan start date. If 
item PSTKL is missing, it is replaced with item PSTKRV. If PSTKRV is also 
missing, it is replaced with PSTK. If it is still missing, it is set to zero. 
Dividend Payer Dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the company paid a dividend (item 
DVC>0) during the fiscal year immediately prior to the loan start date, and 
equals zero otherwise. 
Borrower Age The number of years from the borrower’s founding date to the loan start date. 
The founding date of a RLBO firm is the founding date of its predecessor 
company and is taken from the Field-Ritter data set available on Jay Ritter’s 
website (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). 
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Appendix A1: Continued. 
Variable Name Detailed Definition 
Leverage The book value of debt (total liabilities + minority interest – deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit + liquidating value of preferred stock – convertible debt, or 
Compustat items LT+MTB-TXDITC+PSTKL-DCVT) divided by total assets 
(item AT) at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the loan start date. 
Convertible debt (DCVT) is set to zero if it is missing in Compustat. 
Tangibility The fraction of net property, plant, and equipment in the total assets (items 
PPENT/AT) at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the loan start date. 
Profitability The net income (Compustat item NI) of the borrower during the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the loan start date divided by its book value of total assets 
(AT) at the fiscal year end immediately prior to the loan start date. 
Operating Loss Dummy A dummy variable that equals one if item NI is negative during the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the loan start date, and equals zero otherwise. 
Beta The beta coefficient from the market model using the equal-weighted CRSP 
market index and daily close-to-close percentage returns over the 200 trading 
days ending 11 days prior to the loan start date. 
Stock Return Volatility The standard error of residuals from the market model using the equal-weighted 
CRSP market index and daily close-to-close percentage returns over the 200 
trading days ending 11 days prior to the loan start date. 
Industry Dummies Dummy variables using Ken French’s 17 industry classification at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. 
Term Spread (%) The daily percentage yield difference between ten- and one-year constant fixed 
maturity treasuries at http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/data/us/. 
Default Spread (%) The daily percentage yield difference between Moody’s Baa and Aaa rated 
corporate bonds at http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/data/us/.  
Year Dummies Dummy variables for the years from 1995-2011. 
 
 
Appendix A2 
List of bank loan covenants 
Financial covenants: 
Max. Capex, Max. Debt to EBITDA, Max. Debt to Equity, Max. Debt to Tangible Net Worth, Max. 
Leverage Ratio, Max. Loan to Value, Max. Long-Term Investment to Net Worth, Max. Net Debt to Assets, 
Max. Senior Debt to EBITDA, Max. Senior Leverage, Max. Total Debt (including Contingent Liabilities) 
to Tangible Net Worth, Min. Cash Interest Coverage, Min. Current Ratio, Min. Debt Service Coverage, 
Min. EBITDA, Min. Equity to Asset Ratio, Min. Fixed Charge Coverage, Min. Interest Coverage, Min. Net 
Worth to Total Asset, Min. Quick Ratio, Other Ratio, Net Worth, Tangible Net Worth. 
 
Non-financial covenants: 
Insurance Proceeds Sweep, Dividend Restriction, Equity Issuance Sweep, Debt Issuance Sweep, Asset 
Sales Sweep, Excess Cash Flow Sweep, Percentage of Net Income, Percentage of Excess Cash Flow. 
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Table 1 
 
Summary statistics 
 
This table reports the mean, median, and standard deviation (std.) of the variables for the sample of 1,627 loan facilities. 
We also report the summary statistics separately for the 291 facilities to PE-backed IPO companies and the 1,336 
facilities to non-PE-backed IPO companies. The sample period is 1995-2011. See Appendix A1 for variable 
definitions. Ln(X) denotes the natural logarithm of variable X.  
 
Full  
sample (1,627)  
Loans to PE-backed  
IPO companies (291)  
Loans to non-PE-backed  
IPO companies (1,336) 
  Mean Median Std.   Mean Median Std.   Mean Median Std. 
Loan characteristics            
Lead Bank Share  0.73 1.00 0.36  0.51 0.33 0.39  0.78 1.00 0.34 
Herfindahl Index 0.71 1.00 0.38  0.48 0.26 0.41  0.76 1.00 0.36 
All-In Spread Drawn (bps) 241.20 225.00 127.39  229.85 200.00 147.2  243.67 250.00 122.57 
No. of All Lenders 4.07 1.00 6.74  7.54 5.00 8.46  3.31 1.00 6.05 
No. of Participant Lenders 3.04 0.00 6.73  6.52 4.00 8.46  2.29 0.00 6.03 
Foreign Bank Dummy 0.20 0.00 0.40  0.37 0.00 0.48  0.16 0.00 0.36 
Loan Amount ($m) 126.09 31.75 298.51  215.81 99.28 334.78  106.55 27.00 286.44 
Ln (Loan Amount ($m)) 3.55 3.46 1.65  4.53 4.60 1.40  3.33 3.30 1.63 
Maturity (months) 37.89 36.00 23.18  48.88 59.00 22.03  35.49 36.00 22.73 
Ln (Maturity) 3.40 3.58 0.76  3.74 4.08 0.63  3.33 3.58 0.76 
No. of Fin. Covenants 2.43 3.00 1.50  2.55 3.00 1.33  2.41 2.50 1.53 
No. of Non-Fin. Covenants 2.46 1.00 2.40  3.23 3.00 2.31  2.29 1.00 2.39 
Performance Pricing Dummy 0.47 0.00 0.50  0.66 1.00 0.47  0.43 0.00 0.49 
Secured Loan Dummy 0.86 1.00 0.34  0.89 1.00 0.31  0.86 1.00 0.35 
PE-Bank Relationship ($) 0.02 0.00 0.11  0.13 0.00 0.23  0.00 0.00 0.00 
PE-Bank Relationship (#) 0.03 0.00 0.11  0.15 0.03 0.24  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lead Lender Reputation 0.09 0.03 0.11  0.12 0.08 0.12  0.08 0.03 0.11 
New Lender Dummy 0.56 1.00 0.50  0.40 0.00 0.49  0.60 1.00 0.49 
PE Firm Reputation 1.25 0.00 3.12  7.00 8.43 3.76  0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
Borrower characteristics            
Market Cap. ($m) 1,319.97 231.90 6,333.75  1,052.62 485.37 1,866.02  1,378.20 203.05 6,934.37 
Ln (Market Cap. ($m)) 5.52 5.45 1.63  6.07 6.18 1.48  5.40 5.31 1.64 
Borrower Age (years) 18.26 11.00 20.94  22.14 15.00 21.56  17.41 10.00 20.71 
Ln (1+Borrower Age) 2.57 2.48 0.83  2.78 2.77 0.86  2.53 2.40 0.82 
Leverage 0.47 0.43 0.30  0.60 0.57 0.39  0.44 0.40 0.27 
Tangibility 0.25 0.16 0.23  0.34 0.29 0.26  0.23 0.14 0.22 
Dividend Payer Dummy 0.14 0.00 0.35  0.15 0.00 0.36  0.14 0.00 0.34 
Market-to-Book 2.44 1.83 2.56  1.91 1.51 1.15  2.56 1.94 2.76 
Profitability -0.09 0.02 0.41  -0.02 0.04 0.32  -0.10 0.02 0.42 
Operating Loss Dummy 0.40 0.00 0.49  0.30 0.00 0.46  0.42 0.00 0.49 
Beta 1.35 1.24 0.91  1.18 1.18 0.68  1.38 1.26 0.95 
Stock Return Volatility 0.05 0.04 0.03  0.04 0.03 0.02  0.05 0.04 0.03 
Term Spread (%) 1.00 0.70 1.02  1.32 0.91 1.15  0.93 0.65 0.98 
Default Spread (%) 0.86 0.78 0.34   0.95 0.86 0.38   0.84 0.76 0.33 
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Table 2 
 
PE-bank relationship and syndicate structure: Baseline regressions 
 
This table reports the baseline OLS regression results using the lead bank share per facility (Panel A) and facility 
Herfindahl Index (Panel B) as dependent variables. The regressions in this table use the sample of only the 291 loans 
to PE-backed IPO companies. All models control for year, industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy 
variables, but their coefficients and t-statistics are omitted below. See Appendix A1 for variable definitions. Ln(X) 
denotes the natural logarithm of variable X. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are 
calculated using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level.  
 Panel A: Lead bank share  Panel B: Herfindahl index 
Name of variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
            
PE-Bank Relationship ($) -0.28***   -0.28***  
 (-3.36)   (-3.18)  
PE-Bank Relationship (#)  -0.29***   -0.29*** 
  (-3.28)   (-3.14) 
Market-to-Book 0.03 0.03  0.03 0.03 
 (1.47) (1.51)  (1.54) (1.59) 
Ln (Market Cap. ($m)) -0.12*** -0.13***  -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (-5.40) (-5.57)  (-4.84) (-5.00) 
Dividend Payer Dummy 0.08 0.07  0.09 0.08 
 (1.24) (1.08)  (1.20) (1.05) 
Leverage -0.20** -0.19**  -0.22** -0.21** 
 (-2.39) (-2.23)  (-2.51) (-2.36) 
Tangibility 0.06 0.06  0.06 0.06 
 (0.51) (0.52)  (0.50) (0.51) 
Ln (1+Borrower Age) 0.05* 0.06**  0.06** 0.06** 
 (1.96) (2.13)  (1.98) (2.13) 
Profitability -0.05 -0.04  -0.06 -0.05 
 (-0.42) (-0.33)  (-0.49) (-0.40) 
Operating Loss Dummy 0.08 0.08  0.11* 0.11* 
 (1.29) (1.35)  (1.67) (1.72) 
Beta÷10 0.05 0.10  -0.04 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.33)  (-0.13) (0.04) 
Stock Return Volatility 0.15 0.13  0.18 0.16 
 (0.97) (0.82)  (1.08) (0.94) 
Term Spread (%) -0.08 -0.09*  -0.07 -0.08 
 (-1.63) (-1.72)  (-1.43) (-1.50) 
Default Spread (%) -0.08 -0.09  -0.09 -0.09 
 (-0.99) (-1.05)  (-1.00) (-1.06) 
Constant 2.34*** 2.38***  2.27*** 2.31*** 
 (9.99) (9.97)  (8.91) (8.95)       
      
Observations 291             291              291             291 
Adj. R-squared 0.59 0.59   0.58 0.58 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.  
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Table 3 
 
PE-bank relationship and syndicate structure: Expanded regressions 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results on the effect of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank share per facility 
(Panel A) and on the facility Herfindahl Index (Panel B) with additional control variables. The sample for all 
regressions in this table uses only the 291 loans to PE-backed IPO companies. All models also control for year, 
industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy variables, but their coefficients and t-statistics are omitted below. 
See Appendix A1 for variable definitions. Ln(X) denotes the natural logarithm of variable X. The t-statistics in the 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and clustering at the borrowing company level.  
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 Panel A: Lead bank share  Panel B: Herfindahl index 
Name of variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
            
PE-Bank Relationship ($) -0.27*** -0.26***  -0.27*** -0.26*** 
 (-3.96) (-3.69)  (-3.73) (-3.63) 
Lead Lender Reputation  -0.07   -0.02 
  (-0.48)   (-0.11) 
New Lender Dummy  0.12***   0.13*** 
  (3.20)   (3.45) 
PE Firm Reputation  -0.00   -0.00 
  (-0.48)   (-0.51) 
No. of Fin. Covenants -0.03* -0.03  -0.04** -0.03** 
 (-1.88) (-1.60)  (-2.27) (-2.01) 
No. of Non-Fin. Covenants -0.02** -0.02**  -0.02* -0.02* 
 (-2.00) (-2.04)  (-1.89) (-1.91) 
Performance Pricing Dummy -0.11** -0.10**  -0.09* -0.08* 
 (-2.51) (-2.47)  (-1.85) (-1.80) 
Secured Loan Dummy 0.07 0.10*  0.10 0.12** 
 (1.33) (1.72)  (1.62) (2.08) 
Ln (Loan Amount ($m)) -0.07*** -0.07***  -0.08*** -0.07*** 
 (-3.56) (-3.39)  (-3.52) (-3.31) 
Ln (Maturity) -0.06* -0.06  -0.07* -0.06* 
 (-1.66) (-1.57)  (-1.73) (-1.66) 
Market-to-Book 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.00 
 (0.37) (0.04)  (0.52) (0.20) 
Ln (Market Cap. ($m)) -0.06*** -0.05**  -0.06** -0.05** 
 (-2.62) (-2.37)  (-2.35) (-2.08) 
Dividend Payer Dummy 0.08 0.07  0.08 0.07 
 (1.21) (1.07)  (1.11) (0.96) 
Leverage -0.13** -0.11*  -0.16** -0.13** 
 (-2.20) (-1.77)  (-2.44) (-2.06) 
Tangibility 0.10 0.11  0.10 0.11 
 (1.02) (1.15)  (0.94) (1.08) 
Ln (1+Borrower Age) 0.04* 0.04*  0.05* 0.04* 
 (1.88) (1.82)  (1.89) (1.86) 
Profitability 0.01 0.05  0.01 0.05 
 (0.13) (0.72)  (0.10) (0.64) 
Operating Loss Dummy 0.05 0.04  0.09 0.07 
 (1.14) (0.85)  (1.62) (1.35) 
Beta÷10 0.03 0.08  -0.06 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.32)  (-0.23) (0.03) 
Stock Return Volatility 0.06 0.12  0.08 0.16 
 (0.47) (1.14)  (0.63) (1.37) 
Term Spread (%) -0.06 -0.07  -0.06 -0.07 
 (-1.37) (-1.64)  (-1.19) (-1.42) 
Default Spread (%) -0.07 -0.08  -0.06 -0.08 
 (-0.90) (-1.19)  (-0.80) (-1.10) 
Constant 2.51*** 2.39***  2.44*** 2.28*** 
 (9.88) (10.12)  (8.66) (8.73)       
      
Observations 291         291          291         291 
Adj. R-squared          0.70 0.72   0.69 0.70 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 4 
Endogeneity of PE-bank relationship  
This table reports the lead bank fixed effects (columns (1) and (2) in Panel A), PE firm fixed effects (columns (3) and 
(4) in Panel A), and instrumental variable (IV) (Panel B) regression results on the effect of PE-bank relationships on 
the lead bank share. The regressions in this table use the sample of only the 291 loans to PE-backed IPO companies. 
For brevity, only coefficient estimates of key independent variables are reported. All models also control for year, 
industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy variables. The instrument variable (IV) in Panel B, the Highest 
Bank Relationship ($), is the highest value of the PE-Bank Relationship ($) for the PE sponsor of the borrowing IPO 
company with any banks prior to the current loan. See Appendix A1 for detailed definitions for all other variables. 
The t-statistics (z-statistics for the IV regressions) in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated 
using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level.  
Name of variable    Lead bank fixed effects  PE fixed effects 
Panel A: Fixed effects models (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
PE-Bank Relationship ($) -0.34*** -0.26**  -0.57*** -0.46** 
 (-2.65) (-2.26)  (-3.51) (-2.41) 
      
Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Loan Characteristics Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Borrower Characteristics Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Observations        287            287  291 291 
Adj. R-squared 0.75 0.82            0.76 0.81 
      
 1st Stage 2nd Stage  1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Panel B: Instrumental Variable (IV) methods (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Highest Bank Relationship ($) 0.24***   0.23***  
 (4.17)   (3.02)  
Predicted PE-Bank Relationship ($)  -0.51**   -0.77*** 
  (-2.06)   (-2.62) 
      
Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls No No  Yes Yes 
Loan Characteristics Controls No No  Yes Yes 
Borrower Characteristics Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Cragg-Donald Wald F Statistic       33.53   22.86 
Observations 291 291  291      291 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 5 
 
Cross-sectional heterogeneity of PE-bank relationship effects 
 
This table reports the regression results on the differential effects of PE-bank relationships on the lead bank share per 
facility. The regressions in this table use subsamples of the 291 loans to PE-backed IPO companies. In Panel A, the 
less information asymmetry subsample includes loans to IPO companies with above the sample median average total 
assets of borrowing companies. In Panel B, the less information asymmetry subsample includes loans to IPO 
companies with below the sample median analyst recommendation standard deviation. In Panel C, the less information 
asymmetry subsample includes loans to IPO companies with below the sample median analyst EPS forecast dispersion. 
For brevity, only the coefficient estimates of the key independent variables are reported. All models also control for 
year, industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy variables. See Appendix A1 for detailed variable 
definitions. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level.  
Name of variable 
  Less  
information asymmetry  
  Greater  
information asymmetry 
Panel A: Split sample by size (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
PE-Bank Relationship ($) -0.19 -0.09  -0.28** -0.31** 
 (-0.91) (-0.60)  (-2.24) (-2.62) 
      
Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Loan Characteristics Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Borrower Characteristics Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 111 111  180 180 
Adj. R-squared 0.73 0.78   0.60 0.74 
Panel B: Split sample by analyst recommendation std.       
PE-Bank Relationship ($) -0.19 -0.01  -0.42*** -0.38*** 
 (-1.63) (-0.11)  (-2.76) (-2.63) 
      
Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Loan Characteristics Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Borrower Characteristics Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 148 148  143 143 
Adj. R-squared 0.62 0.77   0.63 0.75 
Panel C: Split sample by analyst EPS forecast std.       
PE-Bank Relationship ($) -0.08 -0.17  -0.35*** -0.26*** 
 (-0.55) (-1.18)  (-3.02) (-3.45) 
      
Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Loan Characteristics Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Borrower Characteristics Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 128 128  163 163 
Adj. R-squared 0.58 0.67          0.72        0.80 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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Table 6 
 
PE-bank relationship and additional syndicate characteristics 
 
This table reports the regression results on additional measures of loan syndicate structure. Panel A reports the Poisson 
regression results on syndicate size. The dependent variable is the total number of lenders per facility. Four loans with 
multiple lead banks are excluded for the regressions in Panel A and the number of lenders is winsorized at ten. The 
mean value of the winsorized dependent variable is also reported in Panel A. The mean number of lenders reported in 
Panel A is smaller than that in Table 1 due to the winsorization and the exclusion of the four loans with multiple lead 
banks. The economic effect of an independent variable in the Poisson regressions can be calculated as the coefficient 
multiplied by the mean value of the dependent variable. Panel B reports the logit regression results on the likelihood 
of having a foreign participant lender. The dependent variable in Panel B is a dummy variable that is set to one if at 
least one of the lenders in the loan syndicate is a foreign bank and zero otherwise. Panel C reports the Poisson 
regression results on time-on-the-market (TOM). The dependent variable is the number of days that a loan is in a 
syndication process before loan inception. The mean value of TOM is reported at the bottom of Panel C. The 
regressions in Panel A and Panel B use subsamples of the 291 loans to PE-backed IPO companies with lead share 
information. The regressions in Panel C use the 234 loans to both PE-backed and non-PE-backed IPO companies out 
of the 2,920 loan facilities for which we have information on TOM. Some loans in the 2,920 facilities do not have 
lead share information. All models also control for year, industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy 
variables, but their coefficients and z-statistics are omitted below. See Appendix A1 for detailed variable definitions. 
The z-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level. For the Logit regressions in Panel B, the 
economic effects of PE-Bank Relationship ($) are reported in the brackets below the z-statistics. The economic effect 
of an independent variable is calculated as follows: For each observation, we vary the variable from one standard 
deviation below to one standard deviation above its actual value if it is a non-binary variable or vary it from zero to 
one if it is a dummy variable, and use the coefficients from the Logit regression to calculate the change in the predicted 
probability, holding all other variables fixed. We average the change in the predicted probability over all observations 
in the sample to get the economic effect.  
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Panel A: Number  
of lenders  
Panel B: Foreign  
bank participation  
Panel C: Loan  
time-on-market 
Name of variable (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
PE Sponsor Dummy      -0.10 -0.42 
      (-0.58) (-0.19) 
PE-Bank Relationship ($) 0.32* 0.27*  3.10* 7.98***  -0.45* -0.66** 
 (1.91) (1.83)  (1.92) (2.61)  (-1.77) (-2.16) 
    [30.3%] [37.2%]   
Lead Lender Reputation  -0.31   1.08   1.54** 
  (-1.18)   (0.24)   (2.53) 
New Lender Dummy  -0.14*   -1.46   -0.09 
  (-1.73)   (-1.09)   (-0.64) 
PE Firm Reputation  0.01   0.53***   0.01 
  (1.04)   (2.91)   (0.33) 
No. of Fin. Covenants  0.09***   2.15***   0.02 
  (2.95)   (3.23)   (0.39) 
No. of Non-Fin. Covenants  0.04**   0.57   -0.01 
  (2.11)   (1.32)   (-0.17) 
Performance Pricing Dummy  0.16*   0.85   0.17 
  (1.93)   (0.98)   (1.32) 
Secured Loan Dummy  -0.02   0.90   0.38 
  (-0.27)   (0.57)   (1.23) 
Ln (Loan Amount ($m))  0.17***   1.68***   0.11 
  (4.51)   (3.76)   (1.39) 
Ln (Maturity)  0.24***   0.82   -0.10 
  (2.89)   (0.99)   (-0.63) 
Market-to-Book -0.09** -0.07**  -0.50** -0.69  0.00 0.05 
 (-2.29) (-2.15)  (-2.11) (-1.32)  (0.04) (0.87) 
Ln (Market Cap. ($m)) 0.27*** 0.16***  1.63*** 1.61**  0.01 -0.10 
 (5.14) (3.64)  (4.25) (2.29)  (0.18) (-1.07) 
Dividend Payer Dummy -0.20 -0.11  -0.48 1.65  0.00 0.03 
 (-1.46) (-0.78)  (-0.44) (0.74)  (0.01) (0.21) 
Leverage 0.40** 0.36***  0.75 -0.83  0.57** 0.42 
 (2.36) (2.73)  (0.52) (-0.32)  (2.06) (1.37) 
Tangibility 0.02 -0.13  2.08 4.82*  -1.09*** -1.13** 
 (0.12) (-0.77)  (1.56) (1.67)  (-2.69) (-2.29) 
Ln (1+Borrower Age) -0.08 -0.07*  0.14 0.49  -0.12 -0.05 
 (-1.42) (-1.71)  (0.41) (1.03)  (-1.12) (-0.54) 
Profitability -0.02 -0.07  -2.69 -7.15  1.55* 1.20 
 (-0.07) (-0.33)  (-1.11) (-0.78)  (1.75) (1.22) 
Operating Loss Dummy -0.27** -0.18**  -0.25 2.46  -0.04 -0.14 
 (-2.40) (-2.00)  (-0.31) (1.23)  (-0.20) (-0.62) 
Beta÷10 0.53 0.09  -2.19 -5.99  -0.69 -0.17 
 (0.75) (0.17)  (-0.53) (-0.56)  (-0.58) (-0.14) 
Stock Return Volatility -0.88** -0.65**  -1.23 -6.87  0.31 0.14 
 (-2.38) (-2.33)  (-0.31) (-1.28)  (0.42) (0.20) 
Term Spread (%) 0.26** 0.18*  1.84** 3.18***  0.25** 0.29** 
 (2.26) (1.76)  (2.51) (2.63)  (2.01) (2.27) 
Default Spread (%) 0.01 0.10  0.94 0.44  1.01** 0.69 
 (0.07) (0.66)  (0.82) (0.30)  (2.17) (1.22) 
Constant -2.88*** -3.81***  -39.27*** -64.75***  3.74*** 4.61*** 
 (-5.41) (-6.32)  (-8.50) (-6.23)  (5.03) (4.35) 
Mean of the Dependent Variable 5.14 5.14     31.05 31.05 
Observations      287       287       278      278       234       234 
Adj. R-squared 0.34 0.39   0.57 0.75   0.32 0.36 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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Table 7 
 
PE-bank relationship and lead bank share: Robustness checks 
 
The dependent variable is the lead bank share at the package level for the regression in Panel D, and is the lead bank share at the facility level for the regressions 
in other panels. We only report the expanded OLS regression results using the sample (subsamples) of 291 loans to PE-backed IPO companies. The model 
specifications are the same as those in Table 3 but include an additional control variable, Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy in Panel A and PE-
Participant Relationship ($) in Panel B. Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy equals one if the lead bank of the current loan is also the lead underwriter 
(or one of the lead underwriters) of the borrowing company’s IPO, and zero otherwise. For each participant lender in a loan, we compute a measure for its 
relationship with the PE sponsor as the ratio of the dollar amount of loans from this particular bank to this PE firm’s portfolio companies over the dollar amount of 
all loans to the PE firm’s portfolio companies during the past five years. PE-Participant Relationship ($) equals the maximum relationship measure for all 
participant lenders in the loan, and is set to zero for sole lender loans. Compared to Table 3, Panel C of this table reports the Tobit regressions, and Panel D reports 
the OLS regression results for the lead bank share at the package level. Panels E and F report the OLS regressions results separately for credit lines and term loans. 
For brevity, only the coefficients of the key independent variables are reported. All other firm-level, loan-level controls and year, industry, loan type, and deal 
package purpose dummy variables are included in the estimations in the same way as in Table 3, but their coefficients and t- or z-statistics are not reported below. 
See Appendix A1 for detailed variable definitions. The t-/z-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated using robust standard errors 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level.  
 Panel A:  Panel B:  Panel C:  Panel D:  Panel E:  Panel F: 
Name of variable 
IPO 
underwriter  
overlapping  
Relationship  
with participant 
banks  
Tobit 
regression  
Package 
level  
Credit 
lines  
Term 
loans 
PE-Bank Relationship ($) -0.26***  -0.24***  -0.18***  -0.21**  -0.19**  -0.45** 
 (-3.72)  (-3.75)  (-3.52)  (-2.23)  (-2.33)  (-2.26) 
Lead Bank-IPO Underwriter Overlapping Dummy 0.09           
 (1.29)           
PE-Participant Relationship ($)   -0.31***         
   (-4.77)         
Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Loan Characteristics Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Borrower Characteristics Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
            
Observations 291  291  291  187  193  95 
Adj. R-squared 0.72   0.75   0.85   0.71   0.78   0.92 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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Table 8 
 
PE-bank relationship and lead bank share: Full sample results 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results on the effects of PE sponsorships and PE-bank relationships on the lead bank 
share per facility for the sample of 1,627 loans to both PE-backed and non-PE-backed IPO companies. We estimate both the 
baseline model (columns (1) and (2), for which we only control for the borrower characteristics but not the loan, lender, or 
PE characteristics) and the expanded model (columns (3) and (4)). For brevity, only the coefficients of the key independent 
variables are reported. All models control for year, industry, loan type, and deal package purpose dummy variables. See 
Appendix A1 for detailed variable definitions. The t-statistics in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates are calculated 
using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the borrowing company level.  
 Name of variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PE Sponsor Dummy -0.10***  -0.01  
 (-3.31)  (-0.15)  
Strong Relationship Dummy ($)  -0.21***  -0.13* 
  (-4.52)  (-1.69) 
Weak Relationship Dummy ($)  -0.08**  -0.01 
  (-2.28)  (-0.15) 
Lead Lender and PE Firm Controls            No             No         Yes          Yes 
Loan Characteristics Controls            No             No         Yes          Yes 
Borrower Characteristics Controls           Yes           Yes         Yes          Yes 
     
Observations         1,627         1,627       1,627       1,627 
Adj. R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.59 0.60 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
                  
